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The Significance of the Adaptive Capacity of Markets for Prospects of Convergence in Law: UK High 
Yield Issuers, US Investors and Insolvency Law. 
Sarah Paterson* 
This article examines something of a puzzle: increasing access by UK issuers of high yield bonds to US 
investors notwithstanding substantive differences in the approach to valuation of the issuer in 
financial distress in US and UK restructuring law and, therefore, in anticipated return on default.  It 
examines the development of the market in the context of existing theories on the relationship 
between law and finance and suggests that previous accounts have overlooked the adaptive capacity 
of the finance market to legal environment and the implications of such structural adaptation for the 
prospects of convergence in law.  Three states are identified: a state in which the market is poorly 
adapted to the legal environment and reinforces other pressure for change, a state in which the 
market is adapted to the legal environment and is a neutral influence on, or even dampens, other 
pressure for change and a state in which both legacy and adapted structures exist, potentially pulling 
in different directions at the same time.  
Keywords: Financial restructuring, convergence in law, high yield bonds, Rubin v Eurofinance SA, 
Chapter 15, Rule 144A and Rule 10b-5 
INTRODUCTION 
US corporates have traditionally relied on debt raised in the capital markets to a significantly greater 
extent than UK corporates.  Sources suggest that US borrowing has been split roughly 70:30 in 
favour of the debt capital markets, compared with an almost diametrically opposed split 30:70 in the 
UK in favour of bank debt.1 However, following the most recent financial crisis there is increasing 
evidence that this picture may be changing.  European banks face economic, political and regulatory 
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 Bank of England, Trends in Lending, 2013 available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/monetary/trendsinlending.aspx 
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challenges which make them unreliable as the sole source of finance for corporate Britain.  Private 
equity sponsored businesses rely on leverage levels which may be unachievable in post-recession 
loan markets and cheaper institutional money may be accessible through the debt capital markets.2 
One aspect of the changing nature of UK debt markets is an increase in the number of high yield 
bonds issued by UK issuers available for purchase by US investors.   A high yield security is a bond 
which is rated less than 'investment grade' by credit-rating agencies.  Credit-rating agencies assess 
the likelihood that a company will default on its debt.  Where the risk of default is low, the credit-
rating agency will provide what is known as an investment grade credit rating for the bond.  Where 
the risk of default is higher, the credit rating will be below investment grade and investors will 
expect a higher interest rate and yield on their investment to compensate for the higher risk.  There 
are a number of levels of rating and the high yield universe covers a reasonably wide spectrum, from 
bonds rated just below investment grade to much riskier bonds which have lost their credit rating 
entirely. 3   
A UK issuer seeking to issue securities for sale in the US market will normally make a so-called Rule 
144A offering.4  Rule 144A provides a means for foreign issuers to offer securities for sale to 
sophisticated investors in the US without becoming subject to all US securities laws requirements for 
public offerings.5  It is popular as a means of persuading European investors that they will be able to 
access the US secondary market in trading the securities which they purchase.6  The fact that a Rule 
144A offering is included and that the bond is governed by New York Law does not, of itself, give any 
                                                          
2
 See AFME Annual Review 2013 and 'Unlocking Funding for European Investment and Growth' commissioned 
by AFME from Oliver Wyman June 2013 both available at http://www.afme.eu/ (last accessed 18 July 2014) 
3
 For a description see Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC, High Yield Bond Primer (2014) available at 
http://www.highyieldbond.com/primer/ (last accessed 18 July 2013) 
4
 Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, all offers and sales of securities must be registered with the SEC 
or qualify for some exemption from the registration requirements. Rule 144A is promulgated under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and provides an exemption and permits the public resale of securities if a number of 
conditions are met, including how long the securities are held, the way in which they are sold, and the amount 
that can be sold at any one time 
5
 See J.A. Fanto and R.S. Karmel ‘A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a US Listing’ 
Stanford Journal of Business and Finance 1997, 54-55 
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indication of the number of purchasers who will actually be based in the US.7  But even if the initial 
purchasers are all based in Europe, European investors demand access to the US secondary market 
when purchasing securities as a source of liquidity and financial advisers advising on the terms of 
issues are therefore focused on delivering a product which will be attractive to US investors.8   The 
Rule 144A offering seeks to assure investors that a broad and deep market will be available to 
purchase the securities, should they decide to sell.  
In addition to liquidity concerns, the investor is also likely to be focused on the possibility that the 
issuer will not be able to meet all of its debt obligations (the risk of default) and on the extent to 
which the investor’s value will be preserved in any subsequent debt restructuring.  In the 1990s, a 
group of scholars suggested that strong laws for minority shareholder protection needed to be in 
place within a jurisdiction before dispersed equity capital markets could develop (in short 'law 
matters').9    Extrapolating the ‘law matters’ thesis from the relationship between corporate 
governance protection for shareholders and equity capital markets to the relationship between 
valuation protection for creditors and debt capital markets, we might expect that sufficient valuation 
protection would need to be provided by the laws of a jurisdiction before a high yield market can 
develop within it.  Yet, as this article will show, a high yield market has been able to develop in the 
UK notwithstanding a somewhat hostile approach to preservation of bondholder value. 
                                                          
7
 It merely enables the securities to be purchased by investors in the US but where the securities are offered 
for sale in the US and in other jurisdictions it gives no indication of how many investors in each jurisdiction will 
purchase 
8
 For the role of the secondary market in providing liquidity see V. Bencivenga, B. Smith and R. Starr, 'Liquidity 
of Secondary Capital Markets: Allocative Efficiency and the Maturity Composition of the Capital Stock' (1996) 7 
Economic Theory 19.  For the importance of US investors as a source of liquidity for bonds issued by European 
issuers see G. Yago and S. Trimbath, Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets (Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 89 and A. Huang, A. Guoming, M. Kalimipalli, N. Subhankar and L. Ramchand ‘Pricing of 
International Private Debt: Evidence from the US 144A Secondary Bond Market’ (13 July 2014) Asian Finance 
Association 2014 Conference Paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298671 (last accessed 2 December 
2014)    
9
 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny. ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 
Journal of Finance 1131; R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 
Journal of Political Economy 1113; R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny ‘Corporate 
Ownership Around the World’ (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471.  The ‘law matters’ phrase was coined by JC 
Coffee see JC Coffee , ‘The Future as History: Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and 
its Implications’ (1999) 93 NW U.L. Rev 641, 644 
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This would appear to support those who have doubted the causal relationship between law and the 
development of capital markets proposed by the ‘law matters’ theorists.  Thus a new case study 
emerges, examining the relationship between insolvency law’s valuation regime and the 
development of high yield capital markets.   In particular, we will be interested in those who have 
recognised the link between law and equity capital markets but have suggested a reverse causality.10  
Some of these scholars have questioned whether a desire to access equity capital markets fuelled ex 
post convergence in corporate governance standards, specifically convergence around a US model as 
foreign firms accessed the equity capital markets of the US for fund raising.   As UK issuers 
increasingly seek access to US investors in high yield debt, similar questions arise as to the prospects 
for convergence in the UK valuation standard towards the US model.  In seeking to address these 
questions, this article will find that none of the existing evolutionary theories provides a complete 
answer, and a new account will emerge of adaptation by the finance market to legal environment. 
The article is organised as follows.  Part 1 considers very broadly the existing evolutionary theories 
relevant to the account.  Part 2 examines the development of the high yield securities market in the 
UK in the context of these theories and reveals a new account of adaptation in the high yield market 
to legal environment.  Part 3 considers the significance of this adaptation in the finance market for 
the prospects of convergence between the approaches of English and US law to valuation in distress.  
Part 4 touches on the interaction between the high yield market and other influences on the law.  
The article then concludes, and a synthesis of existing evolutionary theory and the adaptive account 
in this article is attempted as a framework for future work on convergence between law and finance 
in developed economies.   
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a high level overview of existing 
evolutionary theories which take, as their starting point, other questions of law and finance and 
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 See text to n 23 below 
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which this article will examine in the context of high yield markets and valuation.  As we have 
already touched upon, much of this work is focused on the relationship between the depth and 
strength of a country’s equity capital markets and minority shareholder protection.  Some scholars 
have attempted to explore the relationship between the depth and strength of debt markets in a 
jurisdiction and its insolvency laws,11  but hitherto, with one notable exception, this work has looked 
at the general condition of credit markets and has tended to take a high level approach, in order to 
enable comparisons between a large numbers of jurisdictions,12  or, alternatively, has focused on 
developing or transition economies.13  In contrast, this article will be concerned with a specific 
condition in two highly developed economies.    
The notable exception is research which has sought to investigate the link between corporate 
governance in insolvency and ownership structure.  In 1998 David Skeel published work suggesting 
that there was a strong link between widely dispersed share ownership and ‘manager- driven’ 
insolvency procedures and between concentrated share ownership and ‘manager- displacing’ 
insolvency procedures. 14 The US conformed to this pattern but the UK appeared to be an anomaly 
as it had an established, widely dispersed equity capital market but a ‘manager-displacing’ 
insolvency regime.  John Armour, Brian Cheffins and David Skeel subsequently sought to solve this 
puzzle, suggesting that the missing link was the nature of the credit market in the jurisdiction.15  
Specifically, they proposed that a concentrated credit market was consistent with a ‘manager-
displacing’ insolvency procedure, whilst a dispersed credit market was consistent with a ‘manager-
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 For a good overview see R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and  A. Shleifer, 'The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins' (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 285, 299 
12
 See, for example, S. Djankov, C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer, 'Private Credit in 129 Countries' (2007) 84 Journal of 
Financial Economics 299 
13
 See, for example, R. Haselmann, K. Pistor and V. Vig, 'How Law Affects Lending' (2010) 23 The Review of 
Financial Studies 549; S. Visaria, 'Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: the Microeconomic Impact of Debt 
Recovery Tribunals in India' (2009) 1 American Economic Journal 59; A. Musacchio, 'Can Civil Law Countries 
Get Good Institutions? Lessons from the History of Creditor Rights and Bond Markets in Brazil' (2008) 68 The 
Journal of Economic History 80 
14
 DA Skeel Jr,  ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1325 
15
 J Armour, BR Cheffins and DA Skeel Jr,  ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy 
Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 Vanderbilt Law Review 1699 
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driven’ insolvency procedure.16  They suggested that movement towards a more dispersed creditor 
economy in the UK may drive convergence with US ‘manager-driven’ governance in insolvency.17   
In the event, significant evolutions in the debt markets and restructuring practice on both sides of 
the Atlantic mean that Skeel's original classification of insolvency regimes as ‘manager-displacing’ or 
‘manager-driven’ requires some amendment to reflect current reality and, consequently, Armour, 
Cheffins and Skeel's piece (which built upon it) also requires updating.  The limited space in this 
article will not permit a full analysis which would do justice to the original work and that will have to 
wait for another day.  One point, though, will be worthy of note and we will come back to that later 
in this article.   The analysis begins, however, with the initial condition of the high yield market and 
the 'law matters' thesis.  
In a 1997 paper, La Porta, Lopes-di-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny advanced a specific theory on the 
relationship between law and equity capital markets.18  A number of papers followed and in a 2008 
review of the extent to which the theory had stood the test of time, three of the authors neatly 
summarised it as follows: 
1. Legal rules and regulations differ systematically across countries, and those differences can 
be measured and quantified 
2. These differences in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant extent by 
legal origins 
3. The basic historical divergence in the styles of the legal traditions – the policy implementing 
focus of civil law versus the market supporting focus of common law – explains why legal 
rules differ 
4. The measured differences in legal rules matter for economic and social outcomes.19 
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 ibid 1770-1772 
17
 ibid 1774-1776 
18
 La Porta et al 'Legal Determinants of External Finance' n 9 above 
19
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer n 11 above, 326 
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As with many generalised legal theories, the work has proved controversial.   Some opponents have 
debated whether what La Porta et al describe as 'legal origin' is in fact a proxy for something else, 
most notably the influence of political institutions.20  Building on this theme, others have taken issue 
with whether what emerges is ‘continent-wide evolutions, arguably linked to the process of 
capitalist development' rather than development linked to country-specific features.21  Other 
scholars have queried aspects of the legal origin theorists’ methodology,22 and, as discussed below, 
there have been a number of challenges to the legal institutional account.  For present purposes, 
however, we are concerned not so much with the 'legal origin' controversy but rather with the 
objection of 'reverse causality'. 
Scholars who take issue with the 'law matters' thesis on the grounds of reverse causality argue that 
it is not that the case that the right legal conditions need to be in place in order for markets to 
develop, but rather that countries improve their laws protecting investors as their financial markets 
develop, perhaps under political pressure from those investors.  Cheffins and Coffee have argued 
that contrary to the account of the 'law matters' theorists, in the early stages of its development the 
English market offered only weak protection for minority equity investors but that other factors 
encouraged the emergence of a modern securities system which in turn drove change.23   This 
                                                          
20
 L. Zingales and R.G. Rajan, 'The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth 
Century' (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics, 5 referred to in J. Sgard, 'Do Legal Origins Matter?: The Case 
of Bankruptcy Laws in Europe 1808 - 1914' (2006) 10 European Review of Economic History 389.  And see an 
extensive body of work by Mark Roe, for example M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics' 
(1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641; M.J. Roe, 'Backlash' (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 217; M.J. Roe, 
'Corporate Law's Limits' (2002) 31(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 233; M.J. Roe, Political Determinants of 
Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (Oxford University Press 2006); M. J. Roe, 'Legal 
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets' (2006) 120 Harvard Law Review 460 
21
 ibid Sgard, 409-410, in the context of the development of bankruptcy law in Europe 
22
 M. Graff, 'Law and Finance: Common Law and Civil Law Countries Compared - An Empirical Critique' (2008) 
75 Economica 60; B. Ahlering and S. Deakin, 'Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case 
of Institutional Complementarity?' (2007) 41 Law & Society Review 865, 866 n 1; Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer 
n 12 above, 300 
23
 B.R. Cheffins 'Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies' 
(2003) 23(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; J. C. Coffee, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law 
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control' (2001) 111 The Yale Law Journal 1, 7, 24-25, 60, 65. 
 See also JL Rosenthal and N.R. Lamoreaux, 'Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility: A Comparison of 
Business's Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the Era of industrialization' (2005) 7 
American Law and Economics Review 28, 44 discussing the weak position of minority shareholders in the US in 
the nineteenth century.  But see also La Porta et al n 11 above, 319, challenging Cheffins’ analysis. 
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question of the causal relationship between legal condition and capital markets will be significant in 
the examination of the development of the high yield market in the UK, given the profoundly 
different approach to valuation of the firm in restructuring law from that prevailing in the US. 
The debate also embraces a further distinction of some importance:  the distinction between 
functional and formal convergence.  If markets converge functionally, then it may be possible for 
them to operate in a substantively similar way, notwithstanding persistent differences in the law.24   
Coffee has provided a specific example of functional convergence in equity capital markets. In his 
study of cross-border convergence in corporate governance protections for minority shareholders, 
Coffee pointed to the fact that in accessing US equity capital markets issuers became contractually 
bound by the corporate governance requirements of US securities laws.25  Whilst a regulatory 
contract is not of explicit interest in the context of valuation standards on default of a high yield 
bond issue, possible convergence in valuation standard through the complex finance documents 
negotiated for the issue will be.  Coffee's examination of the securities laws liabilities issues with a 
US listing will also feature in the account.  As UK issuers of high yield bonds access the US debt 
capital market  via a Rule 144A offering, potential US securities laws liability will be implicated and 
we will consider the extent to which this may cause UK issuers to adopt US valuation standards in 
default even in the absence of a strict legal requirement to do so. 
Others, though, have doubted how far functional convergence can go.  Cheffins has highlighted, in 
the corporate governance context, the costs involved in a dual listing (which may act as a deterrent 
for some companies) and the limitations of minority shareholder protection through the regulatory 
contract, given the ongoing influence of local courts.26  Indeed, Coffee has noted some limits to his 
own account of functional, as opposed to formal, convergence.27   Formal convergence involves the 
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 R. J. Gilson ‘Globalising Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function’ (2001) 49 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 329 
25
 ibid 694 
26
 Cheffins 'Bedrock' n 23 above, 15 
27
 Coffee n 9 above, 65-82 
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substantive harmonisation of laws and thus avoids some of the challenges left unsolved by 
functional convergence.28   A number of scholars have argued that institutional persistence and path 
dependency militate strongly in favour of limited change in law, even where the legal regime which 
has emerged has significant defects.29  This may be because of the enormous expense involved in 
abandoning a legal regime which has developed in a particular area, because many of the actors 
involved in the area have invested heavily in understanding how to operate within the status quo 
and because particular interest groups may have a vested interest in resisting change.30  They have 
suggested, however, that outside shocks may prompt change, ‘… institutions which may appear 
fixed, because of their persistence over time, may well be destabilised, in their turn by unpredictable 
external shocks, or through internally generated tensions or "incoherencies"’.31  Borrowing from 
evolutionary theory they identify institutional change characterised by ‘punctuated equilibrium’ – 
periods of relative statis giving way at 'critical junctures' to phases of accelerated development.32   If 
functional convergence is limited or lacking, we might nonetheless discover high water marks 
prompting formal convergence in law. 
Finally, another line of enquiry from scholars investigating the evolution of the law more generally is 
worthy of mention.  These scholars have investigated why parties choose to litigate, as opposed to 
settle, and the contribution of judicial decisions to evolution in the law.33   Armour, Cheffins and 
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 Gilson n 24 above, 342-345 
29
 See, for example, Roe 'Chaos and Evolution' n 20 above; Gilson n 24 above, 334; Aherling and Deakin n 22 
above, 870; L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance' (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127 
30
 ibid.  See also M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 
(Yale University Press, 1982) and  H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 
89 Georgetown Law Journal 439, 453 
31
 Ahlering and Deakin  n 22 above, 280 
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 ibid. See also  Roe 'Chaos and Evolution' n 20 above, 643, 658-663 
33
 See, for example, W.M. Landes, 'An Economic Analysis of the Courts' (1971) 14 The Journal of Law and 
Economics 61; R.A. Posner, 'An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration' (1973) 2 
The Journal of Legal Studies 399; J.P. Gould, 'The Economics of Legal Conflicts' (1973) 2 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 279; P.H. Rubin, 'Why Is the Common Law Efficient?' (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal Studies 51; W.M. 
Landes and R.A. Posner, 'Adjudication as a Private Good' (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal Studies 235; R.Cooter 
and L. Kornhauser, 'Can Litigation Improve the Law without the Help of Judges?' (1980) 9 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 139; R. Cooter, S. Marks and R. Mnookin, 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior' (1982) 11 The Journal of Legal Studies 225;  L.A. Bebchuk, 'Litigation and Settlement Under 
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Skeel have noted that 'English corporate insolvency law has developed through bursts of legislative 
activity interspersed with incremental development by the judiciary'.34   This is a theme to which this 
article will return. 
HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE UK HIGH YIELD SECURITIES MARKET AND ENGLISH INSOLVENCY 
LAW 
High yield debt originally developed in the US as financing for so-called ‘fallen angels’ – companies 
which had recently lost their investment grade status.35  However, during the mergers and 
acquisition boom of the 1980s, led in part by Michael Milkin and the team at Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, a market developed for high yield debt issued as part of the financing for takeover activity.  
Moreover, companies which had never had an investment grade rating began to access the 
market.36   
Towards the end of the 1990s a small high yield market began to develop in Europe, driven in part by 
reduced government bond yields, European Monetary Union,37 and a lower cost of credit risk 
worldwide.38  Developments in UK tax also encouraged the increased use of debt rather than 
equity.39  As acquisition size grew, high yield bonds offered lower pricing and greater debt-raising 
capacity. At this stage, high yield debt was generally 'junior' debt – that is subordinated in right of 
payment on insolvency to senior debt.  Yet its development in the UK was not precluded by the lack 
of a single restructuring regime, which clearly tackled how companies were to be valued in the event 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Imperfect Information' (1984) 15 The RAND Journal of Economics 404; R.D. Cooter and D.L. Rubinfeld, 
'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution' (1989) 27 Journal of Economic Literature 1067; J.S. 
Johnston, 'Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process - An Economic Analysis of Legal Form' (1991) 76 Cornell 
Law Review 341; P.H. Rubin, 'Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand' (2005) 12 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 19 
34
 Armour, Cheffins and Skeel, n 15 above, 1736 
35
 Yago and Trimbath n 8 above, 12  
36
 See definition of 'Junk bond' in  P. Moles and N. Terry, The Handbook of International Financial Terms (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999) , 309 referred to in Yago and Trimbath ibid, 224 
37
 Although, of course, this development of a unified European corporate bond market arising out of the 
integration of European currencies into the Euro did not apply in the UK which retained the British pound. 
38
 Yago and Trimbath n 8 above, 84-87 
39
 ibid, 87 
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of a reorganisation as opposed to a corporate sale.  Yago and Trimbath have argued that the key 
contribution which the high yield market has made to the capital markets is in separating good risks 
from bad risks through liquidity and an active secondary market, monitoring firm performance 
closely and restructuring the capital structure between investors if the firm faces financial distress.40   
Financial distress, as opposed to economic distress, occurs when the firm's capital structure is no 
longer appropriate for its balance sheet and must be adjusted.41 If a financially distressed business is 
to be reorganised, rather than sold, then as Clark explains not only is it necessary to determine 
whether the value of the business as a going concern exceeds the value which would be received if it 
were to be liquidated, but: 
 
Some finite value had to be placed on the whole business.  Otherwise, there would be no way of 
telling where, down the contractually created ranks of creditors and preferred shareholders, it was 
fair to stop issuing shares and other claims in the newly organised entity owning the business.42 
 
As the high yield securities market began to develop in the US, there was already a developed 
restructuring law which tackled these questions.  By contrast, the UK had no single restructuring 
procedure with clearly articulated principles for dealing with questions of value.43  Yet despite this 
apparent uncertainty a high yield market began to develop in the UK as the 1990s progressed.  One 
explanation may be that investors were investing more by reference to the probability of default 
than the return on investment if a default occurred.44  Another plausible explanation, which echoes 
Mark Roe's note of caution about extending theories on the relationship of widely dispersed equity 
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 ibid, 120 
41
 D.G. Baird, 'Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms' (1998) 108 The Yale Law Journal 573, 581-582 
42
 R.C. Clark, 'The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution' (1981) 90 The Yale Law Journal 1238, 1252 
43
 For a more detailed description see S Paterson ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal 
Rights and Regulatory Sanctions’ (2014) 14(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333, 345-355 
44
 See D.J. Wright and F.K. Reilly, 'An Analysis of Credit Risk Spreads for High Yield Bonds' (2010) 35 Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 179, 190 
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markets and the law too far beyond developing and transition economies,45 is that whilst investors 
need a certain level of comfort with the legal system in a jurisdiction in order to begin to invest, in 
the early days of a nascent market that level of comfort and familiarity with the detail of the legal 
system need not be very great. 
This explanation receives some support from another significant difference in the ways in which the 
market was to develop in these early years. On both sides of the Atlantic, the most senior part of the 
capital structure was generally bank debt, usually comprising a term loan and a revolving credit 
facility.46  Although Kaplan and Stein have recorded a decline in the ratio of bank to bond debt in the 
US throughout the 1980s, bank debt remained a significant proportion of the capital structure.47    
In the US at this time high yield bonds were traditionally contractually subordinated to senior 
indebtedness.48  This meant that the borrower of the senior debt was also the issuer of the 
subordinated debt and once the senior creditors had been paid, the holders of the subordinated 
high yield debt would have access to the residual proceeds of the assets.  In the UK, lending banks 
were extremely wary about the arrival of the high yield note holders in the market.  The noteholders 
were an anonymous group, highly fragmented and difficult to locate.  The debt could be expected to 
trade widely, particularly if a default were in prospect, leading to conflicting agendas between 
creditors.49  Moreover, bondholders were unlikely to regard themselves bound by the so-called 
London Approach which still operated in the London market at the time and which established a 
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 Roe, 'Corporate Law's Limits' n 20 above, 233-234 
46
 S.N. Kaplan and J.C. Stein, 'The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s' (1993) 108 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 313, 330 
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 ibid 330.  Kaplan and Stein find that bank debt represented over 70 per cent of total debt in 1982 to 1984 
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 Yago and Trimbath n 8 above, 90 
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 For the arrival of US investors in the UK market see Paterson n 43 above, 337-345; V. Finch, 'Corporate 
Rescue in a World of Debt' (2008) Journal of Business Law 756; V. Finch, 'The Dynamics of Insolvency Law: 
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principled approach as to how lenders were expected to behave when a UK corporate experienced 
financial distress.50   
The UK banks were still providing much of the senior debt in the capital structure of many highly 
leveraged corporates in the English market.  As a result of their concerns, they insisted on structural 
subordination of the high yield bond, as well as contractual subordination.  This meant that the bond 
was issued by a holding company of the borrower of the senior debt, without the benefit of the 
security or guarantee package provided by the operating companies for the senior debt, effectively 
placing the high yield bondholders further away from the assets than the trade creditors.51  This 
structure was highly unpopular and there were signs that it was actively holding back development 
of the high yield market in the UK and in Europe more generally.  The crisis came to a head in 2002 
when greater losses on defaults in Europe than in the US brought home to investors the risks of 
structural subordination.  High yield investors organised and boycotted European issuances for a 
number of months.52 Although the boycott was a fragile one, it was enough to force a gradual 
change in stance by UK banks who increasingly allowed high yield security holders to take 
subordinated guarantees and asset security from operating companies.  Ultimately, it was the arrival 
of the US bondholders as a significant source of capital which acted as the catalyst for change. 
Early restructurings of high yield bonds by UK companies were to pass without significant surprise 
for the market.  In 2002 the British cable group NTL announced that it had reached agreement in 
principle with an unofficial committee of its public bondholders on a comprehensive recapitalisation.   
The proposal involved a significant debt-for-equity swap, with only certain warrant rights allocated 
to equity.  But crucially the restructuring was implemented using a pre-negotiated Chapter 11 plan 
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and followed a pattern of negotiation entirely familiar to the US bondholders.53  Matters were to 
turn out a little differently, however, when MyTravel, a UK-based holiday company listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, sought to implement a restructuring of its bank and bond debt through the 
English courts.54  In an attempt (ultimately successful) to persuade its bondholders to agree to a 
consensual, out-of-court restructuring, MyTravel proposed a scheme of arrangement pursuant to 
which senior lenders would receive a significant equity allocation in a new company in exchange for 
their debt.  The new company would acquire all of the business and assets of MyTravel in 
consideration for this debt exchange and would offer to acquire bondholders' debt in exchange for a 
limited amount of equity.  Bondholders who refused would find themselves stranded in the old 
company – now devoid of any assets to meet their claims. 
The MyTravel case was to bring home to US investors in debt securities issued by UK issuers just how 
different the legal regimes were on either side of the Atlantic.   In a Chapter 11 restructuring, equity 
and creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the plan, with creditors similarly 
situated in the capital structure voting together.  Provided at least one class whose rights will be 
‘impaired’ by the plan votes in favour of it,  the bankruptcy judge may confirm the plan against the 
wishes of other dissenting classes provided the plan meets, amongst other things, the requirements 
of the 'best interests' test and the 'absolute priority rule'.55 The first of these requires that the class is 
no worse off under the plan than they would be in liquidation.56  In many cases this will not provide 
significant protection to holders of debt or equity securities issued by financially distressed 
businesses whose value in the market may be severely depressed.57  The second test provides a 
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more promising ground for challenge.  The absolute priority rule requires that no class may recover 
under the plan until senior classes have recovered what they are owed.58  But the corollary to this is 
that those in the senior class must recover no more than they are owed under the plan.59  Where, as 
will often be the case, the plan involves a debt-for-equity exchange, junior security holders may 
argue that the senior class should not receive the entire equity allocation – otherwise, once the 
business or the market recovers, the senior lenders will recover more than they are entitled to under 
the absolute priority rule.  This has been a fruitful area of litigation for junior stakeholders in the US, 
particularly as jurisprudence has developed to suggest that in assessing value for the purposes of a 
Chapter 11 valuation dispute, courts should look not only to the current market price for the 
business but also to valuation opinions.60  These opinions are highly subjective and have given junior 
stakeholders a potentially useful weapon in defending their continued residual interest in the firm.61  
Scholars have suggested that the consequence of this legal regime is that creditors negotiating in the 
shadow of insolvency law in the US have been motivated to reach agreement without recourse to 
the full weight of a (lengthy, costly and unpredictable)  Chapter 11 valuation fight, increasing the 
prospects that some consideration will be given to the junior class.62 
When MyTravel came to court in 2004, the legal environment for junior security holders in the UK 
was far less hospitable than in the US.  The UK courts had tended to focus solely on the 
counterfactual (what will happen if the restructuring is not agreed, typically a sale of the business 
and assets as a going concern or a sale of the assets on a break-up basis) such that restructurings 
were viewed through the lens of the current market price for the business and assets or, where a 
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going concern sale was not regarded as feasible, the current market price for the assets on a 
liquidation sale.63  This was not a promising battleground for the junior bondholders in MyTravel 
seeking to argue for a continued interest in the company.     
The experience of US bondholders in the MyTravel case was to cause them to organise in a bid to 
press for change. The European High Yield Association (EHYA), a trade association representing 
investors in high yield bonds, made a number of specific proposals for a new English financial 
restructuring procedure in an open letter to the Insolvency Service.  The EHYA proposed a court-
supervised restructuring process involving a stay on enforcement actions, judicial resolution of 
disputes and a system of cram down.64  Mindful perhaps of the powerful clearing bank lobby in the 
UK (as described above, likely to have lent in the senior part of the capital structure) the EHYA 
emphasised the benefits of cram down in preventing those who had no economic interest in the 
company from frustrating proceedings.  Yet, at the same time, the EHYA proposal required judicial 
supervision and the prospect of US style valuation disputes hoved into view. 
The Insolvency Service viewed the EHYA proposal as 'overriding many basic principles of insolvency 
law' and concluded in their reply to the EHYA that there was no evidence that the UK needed the 
EHYA procedure or that it was desirable.65   But at the same time the English market was becoming 
more familiar with the issues at stake and the EHYA exchange did open up debate.  In March 2009 
what was then described as University College London’s Institute of Bankruptcy, Restructuring and 
Insolvency hosted a roundtable entitled 'Is now the time for the UK to adopt a formal proceeding for 
restructuring distressed companies?'  The event was attended by practitioners, academics, scholars, 
judges and, crucially, members of the Insolvency Service (an executive agency of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills with responsibility for insolvency matters) who even went so far as to 
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publish an official record of proceedings.66  In June 2009 the Insolvency Service launched a 
consultation paper 'Encouraging Company Rescue' which sought views on proposals to enable all 
companies to apply for a court-sanctioned moratorium when proposing a Company Voluntary 
Arrangement (CVA) and plans to introduce US-style debtor-in-possession financing concepts.67   
Whilst these proposals were comparatively modest in scope compared with the EHYA proposals, 
when the Insolvency Service reported on responses to the Consultation in November 2009 they 
noted 'scepticism about the benefits of importing new measures drawn from the experience of 
other countries with very different histories and systems'.68   Some respondents noted, in particular, 
the need for protections for secured creditors and, with respect to rescue financing, the principal 
concerns expressed were how the rights of existing fixed charge lenders would be protected, and 
what the effects of the proposals would be on broader lending to business in general, not just those 
in distress.69  The Insolvency Service therefore announced proposals to press ahead with work on the 
moratorium idea but that plans to introduce rescue financing would not be taken forward.70  In the 
event, however, even the moratorium concept was to run into the sand.71 
This short history of attempts by the high yield community to lobby for legislative change is 
illuminating.  Whilst the EHYA attempted to pitch their proposals as making only minor amendments 
to the status quo there can be no doubt that in reality the proposals required a radical overhaul of 
English insolvency law.  Many scholars have noted that for major reform efforts to gain traction 
political institutions need to be prepared to ignore the blocking efforts of interest groups protecting 
existing arrangements.72  In the case of the EHYA’s efforts, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the 
struggle between opposing groups for limited resources the established senior secured clearing bank 
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lobby was to emerge victorious.73  Furthermore, the EHYA proposals required significant expenditure 
comparatively soon after the Enterprise Act 2002 reforms had already purported to overhaul English 
insolvency law.74  This led to only partial engagement by the Government with the reform agenda – 
bringing into play all of the challenges of piecemeal reform which Gilson has highlighted,75 and Clark 
has noted a more subtle interplay in the evolutionary agenda – a need for lawyers 'intellectually 
blinded by the influence of their modes of legal thought' to shift their perspectives and embrace 
change.76  Given the fledgling size of the high yield market, and the continued exposure of leading 
English lawyers to the old ways, it is perhaps not surprising that the market was not ready to shift its 
existing conceptual framework or value systems. 
If formal convergence through legislative change was not to be, what was to be the impact of US 
bondholders on the development of English insolvency law in the cases emerging from the Great 
Recession?  The answer is, relatively slight.  As Landes and Posner have highlighted, a court system 
provides two types of service.  One is resolution of the particular dispute between the parties.  The 
second is what they describe as 'rule formulation' – creating rules of law through the process of 
dispute resolution.77   The unanswered questions of valuation might have been expected to be a 
prime candidate for clarification in the recent recession.  Ultimately, however, only one of the 
restructurings implemented through legal procedure, and involving subordinated debt, resulted in 
full, formal, legal challenge by junior creditors.78  The result was neither to force change nor to clarify 
the status quo but rather to leave the principles by which the English court will decide a 
restructuring perhaps even murkier than they had been before.  On the one hand, Mr Justice Mann 
definitely did not shut the door on arguments that a restructuring should not be judged solely by 
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reference to prices for the business currently available in the market but, on the other, he was 
unsympathetic to efforts by the junior lenders to adopt a less traditional approach to the valuation 
question and was willing to find in favour of senior lenders solely on the basis of submissions from 
Counsel and without cross-examination of the various experts in the case.  It would be a brave 
bondholder who concluded that there had been any real formal convergence between US and UK 
restructuring law on valuation in the most recent downturn. 
 In his work on the evolution of the law through court precedent Johnston has argued that the 
number of cases which come to court is significant.79 He argues that it is the very process of looking 
at exceptions to an apparently settled rule over a number of cases which leads judges to conclude 
that there may be deficiencies in the rule.  Accordingly, an isolated challenge on difficult facts may 
not be expected to bring about radical change.  Yet this does not explain why so few cases did, in 
fact, emerge particularly as challenges might have been expected not only from junior bondholders 
but also junior lenders in complex bank loan structures (with senior debt and other layers of debt 
subordinated (junior) to it).80  Although a number of UK restructurings proceeded consensually, this 
cannot be a complete answer because in some the allocation to junior creditors was very small and 
in others junior creditors were effectively wiped out but chose not to mount a challenge.81  Part of 
the explanation may emerge from the literature on why parties litigate.  Many scholars have pointed 
to the importance of cost/benefit analysis in taking the decision to litigate.82   As Posner notes, on 
the cost side, particular considerations arise in England as a result of the rule that the unsuccessful 
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plaintiff bears the other side's costs as well as his own.83  Furthermore, although a number of 
scholars have sought to show that litigation is more likely where uncertainty prevails in the law,84 
Clark has highlighted that the risk that litigation may harden the law against the plaintiff may deter 
the plaintiff from litigating in the first place.85  The analysis is made even more complex in the 
current context as creditors who are junior creditors today may appear as senior creditors in the 
next case.  In other words, it may not be obvious to them what sort of law it is that they want.86  In 
addition, many creditors may have the benefit of credit default swaps – which provide them with an 
effective hedge against the insolvency of the debtor such that they would rather take no risk on a 
restructuring at all but prefer either to continue to collect interest payments on the debt or collect 
on the credit default swap contract if the debtor fails.87 
In addition to these creditor-orientated reasons for the paucity of cases, wider market conditions 
may also have played a part.  A number of commentators have worried over the so-called zombie 
company phenomenon during this crisis.88  One category of 'zombie' is of particular interest in the 
present context – a company generating enough cash to service its debt but which diverts so much 
of its cash resource to this endeavour that it is left with no money for investment – which should 
mean that it will struggle to compete as the market recovers and demand increases.89  A number of 
factors may have contributed to banks allowing companies in this position to continue rather than 
demanding repayment of their loans in this recession.  The first is that the persistently low-interest 
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rate environment may have enabled some companies to struggle on despite leverage.90  A Bank also 
has an interest in this if it means that the bank continues to receive income and does not need to 
recognise a loss.91  Government may also have contributed.  First, there is some evidence of political 
pressure on banks not to foreclose on firms in difficulty.92  Secondly, strict capital adequacy rules 
imposed by government may incentivise banks not to call in their loans for fear of crystallising a 
loss.93  If the creditors apply no pressure on the business to restructure, then management and 
shareholders may decide that it is safer to struggle on than to risk a restructuring which may be 
unsuccessful and which may crystallise losses which could have been avoided or postponed.94 
This last point receives some support from the experience of many firms who managed to stave off a 
restructuring and to refinance in booming credit markets, fuelled by a persistently low interest-rate 
environment and a relentless search by investors for yield.95  Ironically it is the high yield market 
which has rode to the rescue of these struggling firms.  Thus it would appear, as the market begins 
to turn, that leverage is still high in many UK firms and US high yield investors remain prepared to 
invest notwithstanding a stubbornly pro-senior legal environment.   One possible explanation might 
be functional convergence in valuation standard through the complex finance documents negotiated 
by the parties to a high yield issue.  There is some evidence that these documents may begin to 
contemplate a market value, as opposed to a market price, approach in determining whether debt 
can effectively be restructured without the consent of junior debt holders.96  However, just as Brian 
Cheffins has noted the limits to functional convergence through the regulatory contract, so too 
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protection in the intercreditor agreement is likely to be formal rather than substantive given that the 
subjective opinions are to be advanced by valuers appointed by controlling senior creditors.97 
The continued growth of the market notwithstanding the lack of both functional and formal 
convergence in valuation standard is not as puzzling, however, as may at first appear as new 
adaptations have emerged in the current high yield market itself.  There has been an explosion in 
secured high yield bond issues globally.98   Moreover, the term loan/senior debt feature of highly 
leveraged capital structures appears to be in decline in the UK.   Instead, either a comparatively 
small revolving credit facility has been raised for working capital purposes, which is entitled to 
priority on default, with all bond debt ranking pari passu behind it, or bank and bond debt have 
ranked pari passu in the senior part of the capital structure. Unlike the dramatic increase in secured 
debt, this adaptation in capital structure does not appear to be occurring evenly in the US and 
EMEA.  The law firm Proskauer Rose LLP has undertaken a detailed review of high yield bond terms 
across the globe.  Their survey results illustrate that whilst the number of high yield deals with first 
ranking security has increased in EMEA, exceeding two thirds of all issues in 2013, the trend in the 
high yield market in the US appears to be in the other direction.  In their 2013 Global High Yield 
Report of the secured high yield market 43% of secured high yield bond issues in the US had first 
ranking security, 32% second ranking security and 25% ‘split lien’ (where the bonds have a first lien 
on certain assets and a second lien on other assets) compared with 73% first ranking security in 
EMEA, 19% second ranking security and 8% split lien.  But the most recent Global High Yield Survey 
illustrates a fall in the number of first ranked deals in the US and a growth in EMEA.99  
Although Proskauer Rose's data is aggregated for EMEA, the trend which their data reveals towards 
first priority deals in EMEA reflects data the author has compiled for high yield bond issues by UK 
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issuers over the same period. 100  The higher incidence of second lien debt in the US may suggest that 
investors are more comfortable with the treatment of junior bondholders in the event of a default.  
In any event the adaptation in the capital structure of high yield bond issues by UK issuers may be 
hugely significant for the prospect of convergence in restructuring law. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF ADAPTATION FOR PROSPECTS OF CONVERGENCE IN VALUATION STANDARD 
Determining the law governing the restructuring 
The vast majority of recent Rule 144A high yield bond issues by UK issuers have been governed by 
US (normally New York) law.  Issuers have understood this to be a requirement in order for the 
bonds to be tradable in the US debt capital markets. 101  One option might, therefore, be for the UK 
issuer to submit to a Chapter 11 process (or, at least, to threaten a Chapter 11 process as a 
contingency plan during negotiation).  Its debt is, after all, governed by New York law and it is a 
principle of English private international law that the English courts will recognise a foreign discharge 
of a debt governed by the laws of that jurisdiction.102  However, in order for this to provide a viable 
route, an UK issuer will need to be confident that the English courts will recognise the effects of the 
Chapter 11 plan given that its assets are likely to be located in the UK. The recent decision of the 
Supreme Court in Rubin v Eurofinance casts considerable doubt over this question.103 
Rubin involved a scam perpetrated in the US by The Consumers Trust ("TCT"), established by the 
terms of an English law governed trust deed.  The settlor of the trust was Eurofinance SA, a BVI 
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company wholly owned by Adrian Roman, who was resident in England.  Receivers were appointed 
to TCT in England and the receivers petitioned for Chapter 11 relief in New York.  Various avoidance 
actions were successfully brought against Adrian Roman and his brothers in the Chapter 11 
proceedings and the receivers subsequently sought to enforce the orders against them in England.  
The Supreme Court determined that it could not enforce the orders.  In the leading judgment Lord 
Collins held that the rules for enforcement of a foreign judgment in insolvency proceedings did not 
depart from the ordinary conflicts of laws rules in English law.  UNCITRAL'S Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, implemented in Great Britain in the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, 
was not designed to provide for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments and so the 2006 
Regulations could not be used.104  This left common law rules.105  The judgment of the US Court was 
a judgment in personam and the defendants had not appeared in the proceedings and had not 
submitted to the jurisdiction.  As a consequence, English law conflicts of laws rules for recognition of 
an in personam judgment by a foreign court had not been met and the orders of the US Courts could 
not be recognised.  Furthermore, and significantly for the purposes of this article, in reaching this 
conclusion their Lordships held that the previous case of Cambridge Gas106 had been wrongly 
decided by the Privy Council.   
In Cambridge Gas, a group of insolvent Isle of Man companies were in Chapter 11 proceedings in the 
US.  The Chapter 11 reorganisation plan involved an exchange of debt in certain of the group 
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companies for shares in the ultimate holding company of the Group, Navigator, a company 
incorporated in the Isle of Man. A request was made by the US Bankruptcy Court to the Isle of Man 
court to give assistance by giving effect at common law to the Chapter 11 plan.  A shareholder 
objected to the plan and confirmation order under which the existing shares were to be cancelled 
and new capital represented by that shareholding issued to a committee of creditors.  It argued that 
the order of the New York Court confirming the plan was either a judgment in rem or a judgment in 
personam and that the conditions for recognition and enforcement of an in rem or in personam 
judgment had not been satisfied. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had decided in Cambridge Gas that orders made in 
foreign insolvency proceedings are classified as neither judgments in personam nor judgments in 
rem for the purposes of recognition.  Different principles governed recognition and enforcement of 
such orders.107  The principle of 'universalism' required that wherever possible there should be a 
single insolvency proceeding in relation to an insolvent debtor which takes place in one jurisdiction 
and has one effect and that to this end, wherever possible, the English court should give assistance 
to such a foreign insolvency proceeding.108  However, the English approach was one of 'modified' 
universalism.  The court was able to give assistance to the extent that it would be consistent with 
justice and UK public policy to do so.  In Cambridge Gas this appears to have found expression in the 
principle that the court could grant assistance wherever the domestic court could have achieved the 
same result in the case of a domestic insolvency – and the court concluded that the same result 
could have been achieved by a scheme under the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931.109 Finally, Lord 
Hoffman had found in Cambridge Gas that it was no objection to the implementation of the plan in 
the Isle of Man that the shares in Navigator belonged to a person who was not a party to the 
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bankruptcy proceedings, as a shareholder was bound by the transactions into which the company 
had entered, including a Chapter 11 Plan,110  an analysis for which there is some scholarly support.111  
Lord Collins was certainly not persuaded on any of the grounds.  In concluding that Cambridge Gas 
was wrongly decided he stated: 
The Privy Council accepted (in view of the conclusion that there had been no submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court in New York) that Cambridge Gas was not subject to the personal jurisdiction 
of the US Bankruptcy Court.  The property in question, namely the shares in Navigator, was situate in 
the Isle of Man and therefore also not subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court.  
There was therefore no basis for the recognition of the order of the US Bankruptcy Court in the Isle 
of Man.112  
Much ink has been spilt on the blow dealt by Rubin to principles of universality for foreign insolvency 
proceedings in English law113.  For present purposes, the consequences of the judgment for attempts 
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to recognise US Chapter 11 proceedings with respect to UK issuers are of considerable significance.  
Whilst it is possible to construe Rubin narrowly, and Rubin dealt with different conflicts of laws 
principles than those relating to a foreign discharge of a foreign-law governed debt, the judgment 
raises difficult questions where the Chapter 11 plan involves an exchange of debt into shares in a UK 
company.  Absent an appeal all the way to the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that an English court 
would recognise a Chapter 11 plan pursuant to which New York law governed debt was exchanged 
for shares in a company incorporated in England (or, indeed, in another jurisdiction outside the US), 
assuming that the shareholders did not consent to the plan.  It is suggested, therefore,  that US 
investors in securities issued by UK corporates will find that any debt-for-equity swap is likely to be 
concluded in the shadow of English insolvency law rather than (or as well as) in the shadow of 
Chapter 11 unless other adaptations to the Chapter 11 plan can be introduced and successfully 
defended.114  
What does this mean for UK issuers of New York law governed high yield securities who find 
themselves embroiled in a contentious battle for equity post restructuring?  The answer may be that 
it depends.  In a highly leveraged but effectively ‘pari’ structure (that is, all the bond debt ranks 
equally behind a small amount of revolving credit which is amply covered by the assets, or bank and 
bond debt ranks equally) we might expect to see the valuation debate move back from an inter-
creditor debate to a debate between debt and equity.  In this situation, the bondholders are 
collectively motivated to press for as low a value as possible in order to argue for the entire equity 
allocation.  In this event, even US investors may be best advised to adopt the traditional English 
approach – focusing on the market price of the firm established by market testing rather than a 
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more subjective valuation opinion approach.  Thus, there might be expected to be little pressure 
from US bondholders for change – particularly if there are a significant number of restructurings in a 
generally depressed market.  In contrast, if the restructuring implicates a traditional subordinated 
high yield bond issue, in which the bond is subordinated to a more sizeable portion of senior debt, 
we might expect to find bondholders in the junior piece pushing vigorously for an approach 
consistent with the approach adopted by the US courts and looking to subjective valuation opinions 
to support a residual interest in the company. 
In this account, it is the number of investors entering the market and the capital structures which 
they invest in which determines whether there will be change in the law.  In other words, a complex 
picture emerges of adaptation in the finance markets and sporadic change in the legal environment 
making it hard to predict the interaction between the two systems.  This challenge is amply 
illustrated if one reviews Skeel’s taxonomy for corporate governance in insolvency (‘manager- 
displacing’ and ‘manager-driven’)115 and Armour, Skeel and Cheffins predictive piece on US and UK 
convergence in corporate governance in insolvency which was based upon it.116  As Armour, Cheffins 
and Skeel predicted, the legal techniques used to achieve a restructuring in the UK today (a scheme 
of arrangement or a scheme of arrangement and a pre-packaged administration, discussed briefly 
below) avoid the true manager-displacing features of a full insolvency proceeding in the UK.   
Nonetheless, these techniques continue to afford senior secured creditors significant control rights.  
At the same time, the spectacular boom of US capital structures in which creditors have security 
over all or substantially all of the assets of the debtor and can dictate the course of a debt 
restructuring through the mechanism of the security arrangement, together with the rise of the 
market for distressed debt, has meant that practical, if not legal, control has passed to the secured 
creditors in the US.117  As an English scholar, Gerard McCormack predicted, in many ways from a 
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governance perspective US and UK insolvency law have converged in the middle.118  Indeed, if Skeel 
were writing today he might include a third category of insolvency regime, ‘manager-implemented’ 
and Armour, Cheffins and Skeel might observe US/UK convergence around this third way.  For 
present purposes, the important point is that it is the adaptation in the US finance market to a legal 
environment which creditors regarded as persistently manager friendly which has upset the legal 
evolutionary account. 
Thus, if a traditional subordinated high yield bond issue is to be restructured, investors are likely to 
press for change in the way in which valuation questions are approached, reinforcing other 
influences pressing for change.  But if no change occurs and the legal rules appear fixed, the finance 
market may adapt itself to the more hostile legal environment.  If these adaptations occur, then the 
legal system may experience negative pressure from the finance system, dampening other 
influences pressing for change.  During the process of adaptation it is possible for the legal system to 
experience both positive pressure for change (from legacy structures) and negative pressure for 
change (from adapted structures) at the same time.  In this situation it is extremely difficult to 
predict how the two systems will interact.  This analysis is supported by the approach of the US 
courts to recognition of the restructuring of New York law governed debt by foreign courts.  
Implications of seeking US recognition of an English court restructuring of high yield debt 
A UK issuer restructuring New York law governed debt held by a number of US creditors through an 
English process is likely to wish to seek recognition of that restructuring in the US courts.  This may 
be because it has assets within the jurisdiction which it wishes to protect but even in the absence of 
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assets, the issuer is likely to wish to avoid subsequent legal challenge in the US which may result in 
judgment against it, or which may result in a judgment creditor seeking to enforce in other 
jurisdictions where the company does own assets. 
To date the prognosis for obtaining recognition is encouraging.  The US has implemented the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in Chapter 15 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.  Unlike England (which has also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law but as an 
addition to its other sources of jurisdiction for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings) 
Chapter 15 appears to be a single gateway entitling the US court to assist foreign insolvencies which 
take place in the 'COMI' or 'establishment' of the debtor.119  Several foreign debtors have petitioned 
for, and been granted, Chapter 15 relief in relation to restructurings of New York law governed 
bonds by the English courts.120 It is notable that all of these restructurings have involved schemes of 
arrangement and that none of them has been challenged by bondholders before the UK courts. 
As discussed above, a US chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting class if 
certain confirmation standards are met, including the best interests test and the absolute priority 
rule.  If the plan is confirmed, it is 'crammed down' on the dissenting class.  This power does not 
exist in an English law scheme of arrangement – in order to implement a restructuring without the 
consent of a dissenting class it is necessary to 'twin' the scheme of arrangement with a pre-packaged 
administration in order to strand the dissenting class in an empty corporate shell with no assets.121  
There is a paucity of current case law on this technique in England.  Only two cases have come to 
court dealing directly with a challenge to the plan and introducing valuation evidence.  One of these 
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is not entirely on point as it related to a direct enforcement by a security trustee.122  The other was 
touched on above and appears to have been an under-resourced and hastily assembled challenge.123  
Both cases show the English courts unwilling to shut the door completely on arguments that 
valuation evidence ought to be reviewed in assessing whether a senior class is receiving too good a 
deal under a restructuring plan.124  If the number of US investors holding subordinated bonds issued 
by UK corporates increases significantly, then as we have seen it is possible that more challenges will 
arise to restructuring plans which seek to 'strand' bondholders but which are based solely on market 
price auction evidence as to the value of the business and which do not accommodate US-style 
valuation opinion evidence.  As others have noted, the common law develops only as cases come to 
court and its development is highly dependent on the parties which argue these cases.125  If the 
number of US holders of New York law governed subordinated high yield bonds issued by UK issuers 
increases, it might be anticipated either that plans will be developed and cases will be fought 
adopting a US approach by all sides or that more challenges to restructuring plans articulated in 
different terms will be launched.   
If these sorts of challenges do arise, it is suggested that the desire for recognition of the plan by the 
US courts may lead issuers to prefer to prepare and argue cases in a way which the US courts will 
recognise from their domestic experience.  This is because, although the Chapter 15 cases referred 
to above are encouraging, they are not a reason to be complacent that the US courts will 
automatically accord recognition for an English law restructuring where the issuer's COMI is in 
England.  In the first place, in more contentious cases the US courts have focused on the primary 
purpose of Chapter 15 as protecting the assets of the issuer located in the US.126  This reflects the 
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drafting of the Model Law itself.  Whilst in other cases the US courts have shown themselves willing 
not to concentrate on an asset requirement, it remains a potential route for the refusal of relief 
where the issuer has no assets in the US and is seeking Chapter 15 relief as a purely defensive 
measure to avoid expensive litigation in the US which it is required to defend (or to prevent orders 
of the US court which may be enforced against the issuer in other jurisdictions (besides England) 
where it does have assets). 
Furthermore, in a number of recent cases the US courts have shown greater willingness to protect 
US creditors at the expense of the benefits for the case of recognising a foreign insolvency 
proceeding (and notwithstanding that the creditors have chosen to invest in a foreign issuer).  
Chapter 15 contains an exception which enables the court to deny relief on the basis that it would be 
contrary to public policy.127  Although this is described as a 'narrow' exception, recent decisions 
show a willingness to rely on the public policy exception where the result in the restructuring would 
not be achieved in a Chapter 11 plan.  Appeal courts have shown greater reluctance to expand the 
reach of the public policy exception but have relied on other provisions of Chapter 15 (section 1507 
listing the factors for courts to consider in granting additional assistance and section 1522 requiring 
that the interests of creditors and its debtor be sufficiently protected) to much the same effect.128   
Two relatively recent cases focus on granting of relief where the foreign debtor's assets have been 
sold in the main insolvency proceeding – highly relevant if a restructuring in the UK is implemented 
via a pre-packaged administration sale.  Whilst the cases of Elipda Memory and Fairfield Sentry 
suggest that the US court will reserve plenary review of the sale under section 363 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code to situations where the assets concerned are located in the US, certain statements 
made by the court in Fairfield Sentry, in distinguishing Elipda, suggest that there are other grounds 
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on which the US court may undertake a more extensive review.129 A UK issuer restructuring a New 
York law governed bond is likely to wish to have the comfort of Chapter 15 relief but, equally, an 
application for relief which is denied may be more damaging than refraining from seeking relief at 
the outset.  It is suggested that this is likely to cause an issuer in contested restructurings to wish to 
be able to present its case to the US court in a way which the court will recognise – encouraging a 
focus on valuation opinions as well as market price and in voting on the plan in a way which is 
consistent with voting on a Chapter 11 plan. 
On the other hand, as already suggested, the position may be entirely different in a ‘pari’ structure 
where the battleground is between bondholders and equity.  In this case, the approach may turn on 
whether US investors are present only in the debt or in the debt and equity.  In the former case, they 
are likely to be content with the traditional English law approach and, as we have seen, in non-
contentious cases (where US investors have not opposed the grant of relief) the US courts have been 
quick and generous in granting the necessary orders.  Where, on the other hand, US investors 
inhabit both the debt and the equity, similar considerations as to the approach of the US courts may 
apply.130 
Position of directors of the issuer and the issuer's advisers 
In the brief review of the literature on convergence in corporate governance at the start of this 
article, reference was made to Coffee's analysis of convergence through securities laws.131 Whilst 
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accessing US debt capital markets does not incorporate US securities laws explicitly relating to 
restructuring, and so Coffee's example of convergence through the regulatory contract is not strictly 
relevant for this account,  US securities laws requirements in a Rule 144A offering could nonetheless 
provide another indirect driver for  functional convergence.  Coffee's work highlighted the 
significance of securities laws liability in deciding to access US equity capital markets and this liability 
question does remain relevant for UK issuers accessing US debt capital markets.  Whilst Rule 144A 
offerings are exempt from US Securities Act registration, they continue to involve many of the 
features of US public offerings.    In particular, issuers, underwriters and their controlling persons are 
potentially liable to purchasers of securities with respect to material misstatements and omissions in 
offering documents.  Section 12(2) of The Securities Act 1933 applies to offers and sales of securities 
whether or not registered (and to Rule 144A offerings) and provides liability for untrue statements 
of material facts and omissions in offering documents for a seller of securities 'who shall not sustain 
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of such untruth or omission ….': the so-called ‘due diligence’ defence of underwriters in 
securities litigation. 132   Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act 1934 makes it unlawful, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security 'to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading'.  The Supreme Court has held that 10b-
5 liability arises only if the party charged has 'scienter' (which broadly includes intent to defraud, 
recklessness and similar standards).133  This means that a party which engages in due-diligence type 
procedures, as well as seeking to rely on the due diligence defence for the purposes of section 12, 
should also be less vulnerable to a 10b-5 claim on the basis that its due diligence procedures are 
inconsistent with 'scienter'. 
                                                          
132
 The due diligence defence also applies to liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 which is 
only applicable to public offerings of securities and not Rule 144A offerings 
133
 Ernst v Ernst & Hochfelder 425 US 185 (1976) cited in Alistair Alcock, 'Rise and Fall of Private Actions Under 
Rule 10b-5' (1998) Journal of Business Law 230  
35 
 
In order to address these due diligence concerns, the practice has developed in all public offerings of 
securities in the US, and in Rule 144A offerings, that the US underwriters will request Counsel 
involved in the transaction to provide disclosure opinions in connection with the offering.  In general 
(and unlike practice in the English market where 'cross table' opinions are not typically provided in 
debt transactions) opinion letters will be sought from counsel for both the issuer and the 
underwriters.  Although in some transactions underwriters will be willing to settle for only one letter 
it would be unusual (and 'off market') for the underwriter's counsel to give an opinion where the 
issuer's counsel does not give one.  If only one letter is to be provided it is likely to be the issuer's 
counsel who is providing it rather than the underwriter's counsel. 
Thus in any subsequent financial restructuring, the spectre of securities laws litigation haunts all 
those involved in the original offering for the issuer.   In addition to federal securities laws, state 
securities laws and the common law may be engaged.  Investors may be incentivised to bring 
securities laws litigation which can be targeted at deep pockets rather than the beleaguered issuer.  
In these circumstances, there may be a strong incentive for a UK issuer and its advisers, unfamiliar 
with the labyrinth of US securities laws litigation, to reach a consensual restructuring with its 
creditors, adopting a US-style approach to navigating a path to agreement.  But how strongly this 
incentive operates may depend, again, on precisely where the US investors sit in the capital 
structure.  In a ‘pari’ bond structure an aggressive plan for bondholders to retain all of the equity 
may delight US investors.  On the other hand, in a more traditional subordinated structure, US 
bondholders may react angrily to attempts to cut them off through a scheme and pre-packaged 
administration structure and may point to the terms of the securities offering document in 
maximising their leverage.   In this event, investors in the high yield market are likely to reinforce 




In Part III, the pressure for change coming from the high yield market was described in terms of its 
effect on other influences in the market.  The high yield market represents only one of a number of 
influences on the legal system.  Even if the high yield market is well-adapted to the apparently fixed 
legal regime, other influences may nonetheless continue to press for change in the law.  The 
problem of prediction does not just lie, therefore, in the complexities arising within the high yield 
market itself but also in identifying other influences which may destabilise the legal system.134   A 
complete review of all the influences on the question of valuation in restructuring law is outside the 
scope of this article and, in any event, probably impossible without the benefit of a crystal ball or a 
good deal of luck or hindsight.  But it is worth touching on a couple, at least by way of illustration.  
The first comes from the finance market itself.  
 Although the high yield market now represents an increasingly significant proportion of the English 
finance market, loan debt remains extremely important.135  This is compounded by the speed with 
which the high yield market can shut down and the attractions for investors in financing loans rather 
than bonds.136  As many of the so-called 'alternative lenders' have begun to provide loan finance 
through primary deals there is some evidence that the structure of highly leveraged loan facilities 
may also be changing.  Just as high yield bond structures traditionally comprised some senior (lower 
priced) debt and some subordinated (high yield) debt, so a highly leveraged loan structure would 
traditionally comprise senior (lower priced) debt and subordinated (mezzanine or junior) debt at a 
higher interest rate.  A new phenomenon has, however, made an appearance in the UK market – so 
called unitranche facilities.137  Unitranche technology has existed in the US for some time but has 
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only recently appeared in English deals.  In a unitranche loan, the senior and junior debt is combined 
into a single facility which ranks pari passu, either at the top of the structure or, like the ‘pari’ high 
yield bond structures, behind a relatively small revolving credit, capital expenditure or acquisition 
facility which is well-covered by available collateral.  The borrower pays a single, blended interest 
rate for the unitranche facility which is higher than the rate which would have been paid for the 
senior piece but lower than the rate which would have been paid for the mezzanine piece.  
Unitranche lenders are likely to be entirely happy with an approach to valuation based on current 
market price for just the same reasons as were advanced for 'pari' high yield bonds.  The valuation 
fight might be expected to be between creditors and equity rather than an inter-creditor battle and 
the lenders are likely to prefer an argument which favours 'cutting off' the equity holders.  
Unitranche lenders and 'pari' high yield bond investors are both likely to operate as influences 
dampening demands for a change in the English approach to valuation. 
However, whilst unitranche facilities are appearing in the English market, the move to this structure 
in the loan markets is not as pronounced as the move to the senior secured structure in the high 
yield bond market.138  Unlike investors in unitranche facilities, junior or so-called mezzanine lenders 
can be expected to continue to prefer a move to a US style approach to valuation, and the 
introduction of valuation opinions rather than a reliance on market price alone.  Thus mezzanine 
lenders are likely to operate as an influence reinforcing other demands for change. 
At the same time, there is continuing pressure for greater substantive harmonisation in insolvency 
law in Europe in general, and in financial restructuring in particular.  The European Commission has 
released a recommendation for Member States to review pre-restructuring procedures in their 
jurisdiction. 139 The recommendation has no legal force but it does carry political weight.  The 
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Commission has asked Member States to enact appropriate measures within one year and has 
stated that it will review progress after 18 months in order to evaluate whether further measures 
are needed.140  It might, therefore, be expected to be the first indication of where harmonisation 
efforts in this area could go.  Interestingly, the Commission proposal includes a 'cram down' 
procedure – the ability for a court to impose a restructuring plan on a dissenting class – and sets out 
the minimum conditions for the court to provide its confirmation: 
(a)  the restructuring plan has been adopted in conditions which ensure the 
protection of the legitimate interests of creditors; 
(b) the restructuring plan has been notified to all creditors likely to be affected by 
it; 
(c)  the restructuring plan does not reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below 
what they would reasonably be expected to receive in the absence of the 
restructuring, if the debtor's business was liquidated or sold as a going concern, 
as the case may be.141 
Whilst it appears to be envisaged that creditors would have a right to be heard on the application,142 
the valuation approach adopted in the proposal also appears to be on all fours with the traditional 
English approach – provided the dissenting class receives no less than it would have received on a 
liquidation or a going concern sale (as the case may be) then the plan may proceed.  Thus the 
indications from Europe would appear to be a negative influence for change and, at this stage at 
least, would appear to pull in the same direction as the structural adaptations in the high yield 
market.  
CONCLUSION 
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This brings the analysis back to the debate between ex ante and ex post convergence as a condition 
for access to foreign markets. The account here, in which investors pushed for structural change in 
what they perceived as the highly disadvantageous terms on offer in the UK and Europe when 
compared with the US, supports the view of those who have argued that it is the entrance of new 
players in the market pressing for change which drives reform.  The short history of the failure to 
bring about legislative change reinforces the problems of path dependency and the lack of evolution 
through judicial decision highlights many of the problems with relying on case law to bring about 
reform which others have noted.  
Yet this article also highlights the adaptive capacity of the finance market itself.  Thus, provided 
certain minimum standards are met, the finance market is able structurally to adapt to the legal 
environment, where the legal environment remains resistant to change.  Three states are identified: 
a state in which the high yield market is poorly adapted to the legal environment and reinforces 
other pressure for change, a state in which the high yield market is well-adapted to the apparently 
fixed legal environment and dampens other pressures for change and a state in which both legacy 
structures and adapted structures exist at the same time, potentially pulling in different directions.  
 The difficulty in predicting how the market will move between the three states, coupled with the 
difficulty of predicting how it will operate with other influences pushing for or against change, 
illustrate the impossibility of predicting accurately how the systems will evolve. Moreover, this 
article has investigated a very specific example of the relationship between the law and the finance 
market from two highly developed economies.  It is difficult, therefore, to draw conclusions for the 
co-evolutionary account of law and finance markets more generally.  Instead, a synthesis is 
attempted of existing theories and the significance of the adaptive capacity of finance markets 
explored in this article which, it is hoped, might prove a useful framework against which other 
examples from developed economies can be tested:    
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1. There needs to be a certain level of confidence in the legal institutions of a country for a 
market to begin to develop, but at this stage the detail of the legal system may be poorly 
understood by investors 
2. As the market develops, cases will arise which will highlight differences in its operation from 
other legal regimes with which the investors are more familiar 
3. If there are other compelling reasons to invest, this will not necessarily act as a complete 
brake on the development of the market but may give rise to positive efforts to bring about 
change in the law by (i) lobbying for legislative change (ii) litigation 
4. How successful these efforts will be may depend on the extent to which (i) the legislature is 
receptive to the demands of these market actors (ii) cases come to court.  This may depend, 
amongst other things, on the number of players in the market and whether other actors or 
influences are pulling in the same or a different direction 
5. If the legal environment remains persistently hostile, capital structures may nonetheless 
adapt to the legal environment.  If these structural adaptations occur they may reduce 
pressure or even act as a negative influence for change – depending on how well-adapted 
capital structure is to the legal environment 
6. If new capital structures are well-adapted to the legal environment, the stability of the legal 
environment may depend on how wide spread the adaptations are and whether other 
influences are pulling in the same direction. 
A fascinating question remains unanswered by the scope of this article.  If the legal environment 
does remain resistant to change but adaptations occur in the finance market dampening pressure 
for change in law, the question arises as to whether these adaptations increase the cost of capital 
within the jurisdiction in which they occur.  Ultimately, this is the heart of the 'does law matter?' 
debate.  It is notoriously difficult to compare spreads on high yield bonds.143  But it is hoped that a 
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comparison between spreads on US second-lien structures and European pari passu senior secured 
structures might prove a promising area for future research. 
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